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Abstract
This paper studies labour market policy in a society where dif-
ferently gifted individuals can invest in training to further increase
their labour market productivity and where the government seeks both
e¢ ency and equity. Frictions in the matching process create unemploy-
ment and di¤erently skilled workers face di¤erent unemployment risks.
We show that in such an environment, training programmes that are
targeted to the unemployed complement passive transfers (UI benets),
unlike a general training subsidy. Combining passive subsidies with a
training subsidy conditioned on the individual being unemployed (for
a while) - the typical Active Labour Market Programme - implies a fa-
vorable trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency which encourages high
spending on training.
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1 Introduction
A stylized fact is about to emerge among the developed countries. Passive
and active unemployment programmes seem to be complementary tools to
the governments. Passive programmes are traditional unemployment in-
surance schemes and active programmes are training activities targeted at
unemployed individuals as opposed to, for instance, a general training or
education subsidy. Active programmes can be education aiming at upgrad-
ing the unemployed workersskills or employment programmes supposed to
prevent skill loses during periods of unemployment.
Figure 1 illustrates the patterns by which public funds are spent on pas-
sive and active policy programmes among selected OECD countries. Active
and Passive policy seem to be complements. The apparent complementary
pattern is also found following a particular country over time. In this case
major reforms are visible as structural shifts. In fact, it is hard to nd exam-
ples of countries to whom the picture suggests that the two policy measures
are substitutes rather than complements (see the Appendix).
Another feature that has emerged together with the higher emphasis
placed on active policy by many advanced countries since the mid 1990s1,
is that the high spenders among these seem to operate on a more favorable
equity-e¢ ciency trade o¤than the other countries. We see this by comparing
Figure 1 to Figure 2, which suggests the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ for the
1See the European Commision (2004) and OECD (2003).
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Figure 1: Active and passive labour market policy as percentages of GDP
for OECD countries
group of countries considered. Consider for example the three countries
which spend relatively most on Active and Passive Labour market policy,
Finland, Denmark and Sweden. Those countries are also the countries with
the lowest gini-coe¢ cients and still is GDP per capita not signicantly lower
than for the other OECD countries. On the other hand, the USA, the UK,
and Italy are spending relatively little on labour market policy and are also
the countries with the most unfavorable trade-o¤between GDP and equality.
France and the Nether Lands are in between the two groups; Canada is doing
better and Germany and Spain worse in terms of equity given their spending
on labor market policy.
Suppose that the optimal policy for any given weight placed on equity
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relative to e¢ ciency, reveals complementarity, then the reason for the phe-
nomenon in Figure 2 could be that as long as active and passive policy mea-
sures are used in the optimal proportions (and that the active programmes
are e¢ ciently organized) then higher spending creates not only higher eq-
uity but also a more favorable trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency in the
sense that the equality goals are not as expensive to reach as they would
otherwise have been. That is, spending on programmes in an optimal way
moves you to the right in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Ginicoe¢ cient and GDP per capita for OECD countries
In this paper we discuss what features could potentially account for this
phenomenon. We consider an economy with two types of working-life paths;
one in the fast lane and one doing unskilled jobs. The unskilled jobs
are simple jobs, they require little in terms of ability and skills and the
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productivity is low independently of the workers abilities. The advanced
jobs on the other hand require skills, and the productivity and wage can be
high. However, the content of the skills required changes frequently and in
order to continue to be able to perform well in an advanced job your skills
have to be adjusted accordingly. Hence, a worker who wants to keep an
advanced job has to re-invest continuously in training in order to maintain
a constant productivity distance to unskilled labour. That is the life in the
fast lane. These assumptions are inspired by the way new technology
often inuences the work situation.2
In order to focus the policy discussion we assume that all education
opportunities which yield a positive private return have been undertaken,
and on top of that we consider a labour market that allocates labour e¢ -
ciently. But the labour market produces signicant wage dispersion if work-
ers are heterogeneous in ability; the disadvantaged workers receive much
lower wages and face higher unemployment risk than advantages workers.
Therefore, policy is justied if the government is also concerned with equity.
2New technology changes fast and the complementary skills acquired in order to manage
any given technology decade change fast as a consequence. In such an environment, human
capital investment is an ongoing concern; re-investments in learning is a necessity in many
jobs; also in lower level skilled jobs. In order to keep a job as a computer operator
one has to train continuously. If you are only able to operate old versions of soft-ware
and equipment even though these are just a few years old, this is almost like you have
no professional computer skills at all, which implies that you work as unskilled labour
as far as computer jobs are concerned. Staying a head in a good job requires training
continuously. So training costs are not something that are incurred once and for all and
then you are skilled for the rest of your life. Of course, this problem is of no concern to
individuals that abstain altogether from investing in training.
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The government in this paper has taste for both e¢ ciency and equity
and in order to pursue its concerns it considers two policy instruments. UI
benets and training subsidies, either a general education subsidy that all
workers can take-up a while or a more targeted one that only some workers
can take-up, long term unemployed workers, for instance. These instruments
have di¤erent e¤ects on the labour market. Unemployment falls if workers
are better educated or trained and increases if workers obtain higher unem-
ployment benets. However, higher benets reduce inequality. UI benets
are automatically given disproportionately to low income individuals as they
are unemployed the most, and hence, a UI benet scheme is a way of re-
wording low income individuals without distorting much the incentives for
human capital investments at the top. Also an education or training subsidy
can only reduce inequality if not all workers take it up, which does not hap-
pen automatically. All this is developed in a model of competitive labour
auctions with coordination frictions (Julien, Kennes and King 2000, Shimer
2001).
The focus of our policy analysis is the following questions: are active pro-
grams complements to passive programs, and if so what is the best active
complement to a passive UI benet scheme, an education subsidy scheme for
all or a training subsidy targeted at the least able workers. These questions,
in particular the one concerning general versus targeted policy, have not
been addressed by the fast advancing literature on how to organize unem-
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ployment policy (targeted policy in our terminology).3 And in contrast to
the economics of education literature we focus on a governments (possibly)
equity concerns as that drives the policy conclusion. For instance, there
are no externalities in our model to make training subsidies optimal from
an e¢ ciency point of view. But there could be an equity motivated case
for a training subsidy in situations where the advantaged workers face lit-
tle unemployment and the disadvantaged workers face high unemployment.
The advantaged workers invest in training and their expected private return
covers the costs of the investment. They all choose the "fast lane" strategy.
The disadvantaged individuals might also nd it worth the while to train if
it had not been for the risk of unemployment and the associated reoccur-
ring idleness of costly skills. If the expected unemployment is high then the
private return - the higher wage during the employment spells - is not high
enough to cover the training costs incurred. So a subsidy might be called
for here. However, as mentioned above, a training subsidy taken up by all is
never optimal because it will not improve on equity. A training subsidy can
be optimal only if it is possible to restrict it to the disadvantaged individuals.
But as we shall see, there is a limited scope for using self-selection schemes
unless mimicking can be made expensive; for instance, by conditioning the
3This literatur is surveyed in Frederiksen and Holmlund (2003). One of the more
complex contributions of this litteratur, to follow along from the seminal paper by Shavell
and Weiss (1979), is the recent study by Pavoni and Violante (2004) who characterizes the
optimal sequense of di¤erent elements of labour market policies along an unemployment
spell. Their main conclusion is that the timing of the variours elements - passive as well
as active - of a targeted policy is very important for the e¤ectiveness of the overall policy.
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subsidy on worker characteristics - directly or indirectly.
This is where active labour market policy comes in. Ability is private in-
formation so the conditioning needs to be indirectly and these programmes
are indirectly targeted to the disadvantaged workers: participation is con-
ditioned on a certain duration of unemployment prior to programme partic-
ipation, and disadvantaged workers are the ones most likely to experience
long term unemployment.
The optimal combination of UI benets and targeted training subsidies
(i) greatly reduces the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤, (ii) increases the com-
plementarity relationship between optimal active and passive policies and
increases the use of both for given preferences. The reduction in the equity-
e¢ ciency trade-o¤ cannot be achieved by a passive subsidy that is only
given to the long term unemployed. The reason why a targeted active sub-
sidy works better than a targeted passive subsidy is that a disadvantaged
workers earning capacity goes up and so does realized earnings when he or
she is being subsidized into training. A passive subsidy does not increase
the workers earnings capacity.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple
directed search model with a government that wish to maximize a social
welfare function using a number of policy instruments. In section 3, we
solve the equilibrium of the model with general training, whereas Section 4
is concerned with the equilibrium when training is targeted. In section 5,
we evaluate the model numerically. Section 6 is a discussion and in Section
8
7 we o¤er some concluding remarks.
2 The model
The workforce consists of a total population of N innitely lived workers.
The workers are risk neutral with a subjective rate of time preference equal to
. There are two types of workers, i 2 fA;Dg where type A are advantaged
and typeD are disadvantaged. A fraction  of the labour force is advantaged
and the remaining fraction is disadvantaged.
Workers can choose to train, h = 1; or not, h = 0. For a worker of
type i , let yih denote the productivity during employment where y
i
1 > y
i
0.
Let the cost of training be ci   g units of output per period, where g is
a government subsidy to training. The training decision is modelled as a
decision to pursue a career that requires a constant investment in skills (as in
any balanced growth path). Therefore, higher productivity is achieved only
if the worker pays this cost each period regardless of employment status.
Search and coordination friction. It is associated with frictions to get
workers and jobs coordinated. Firms have free entry and open job vacancies
with a resource cost k per vacancy. The job vacancies are directed towards
specic types of labour, search is directed, and each group of workers, dis-
tinguished by type and training investment, are in distinct submarkets with
independently determined quantities of vacancies. Matching in each sub-
market is random. Therefore, if v job vacancies are opened, a job searcher
9
in this submarket is approached by a rm with probability
p = 1  e ; (1)
where  = v=s is the ratio of v vacancies to s job searchers in the submarket.
We assume that all job matches are destroyed with a common exogenous
probability, :
Wage determination. Let  denote the present value of a match between
a worker of human capital level h and a job vacancy. This present value is
given by
 =
y   (c  g)h+ (V +)
1  (1  ) ; (2)
where V is the present value of a job searcher and  is the expected prot
of an unmatched job. Wages are determined by a simple labour auction
market (ref: Julien, Kennes and King 2000)4. Thus the present value V of
a job searcher is given by
V = maxfV (u) + ()(  V (u)); 0g; (3)
where ()  1   e    e  is the probability the worker has multiple
o¤ers and V (u) is the value of an unemployed worker. The value V is the
reserve wageof each labour auction. The equilibrium present value of a
job vacancy is given by
 = maxf k + e (  V (u)); 0g; (4)
4Specically, the auction implies that the entire surplus of a match goes to the rm
if the worker is matched with only one rm, and the entire surplus goes to the worker if
(s)he is matched with two or more rms. An unmatched agent gets zero.
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where the free entry of job vacancies ensures that  = 0. A worker that
leaves employment by a dislocation shock is a job searcher next period. The
value of such a worker is given by
V (u) = maxfa  (c  g)h+ V; 0g; (5)
where a denotes unemployment insurance benets.
All workers can choose to either train or not. The workers choice of
human capital maximizes the return to a worker that enters the workforce
unemployed. Thus
h =
8<: 10 V jh=1  V jh=0otherwise : (6)
The values V jh=1 and V jh=0 are each determined by equation (6) for the
appropriate value of h.
The governments problem. Let WA and WD denote the average per pe-
riod income of advantaged and disadvantaged workers, respectively. Social
welfare is determined by a social welfare function, which takes as its argu-
ments, WA,WD and . It is convenient to assume that this social welfare
function has the following functional form:
Y = (WA + (1  )WD) + (1  )minfWA;WDg; 0    1; (7)
which is a weighted average of a Benthamite sum of utilities social welfare
function and a Rawlsian social welfare function.
The government chooses transfers to unemployed and employed workers
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to maximize social welfare. In addition to the training subsidy, g; the gov-
ernment gives all unemployed workers an unemployment insurance benet,
a. The unemployment insurance is a passive benet, because the worker has
complete freedom on how it is spent. However, a general training subsidy is
an active measure in a sense, because it has to be used on a specic activity,
namely human capital investment. Both transfers are paid by a lump sum
tax, t. The government balances its budget by setting
t = (auA + hg) + (1  )(auD + h0g); (8)
where uA and uD indicate the unemployment rates of advantaged and dis-
advantaged workers and h and h0 are their respective human capital choices.
2.1 Equilibrium
We can now derive the equilibrium of the model. First we derive the unem-
ployment rate. Consider the gross labour market ows for a group of workers
that have market tightness given by . The fraction of workers employed in
a period is given by
qt = zt + p()st; (9)
where zt is the fraction of all workers that are employed because they did
not lose their jobs last period and p()st is the fraction of all workers that
are employed because of a successful job search this period. At the end of
each period each worker becomes unemployed with probability . Thus
zt = (1  )qt 1: (10)
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The ows in and out of employment imply that the steady state fraction s
workers engaged in job search in each period is given by
s =

 + (1  )p(i)
: (11)
Job searchers that do not nd a job are unemployed. Thus the unemploy-
ment rate is given by
u = (1  p)s: (12)
Jobs and human capital: the per period income of a worker investing in
human capital can be written as follows
W ih = G
i
h   h(ci   g)  t; i 2 fA;Dg; h 2 f0; 1g; (13)
where Gih is the workers labour market income as a function of their training
decision, g is the governments subsidy to training, h(ci   g) is the cost of
training that is born by the worker.
For each type of worker, i 2 fA;Dg; the training decision is determined
by the di¤erence between the cost of training, ci   g, and the benet of
training, Gi1  Gi0. Thus the optimal value of h for each group of workers is
given by
h =
8<: 10 G
i
1  Gi0  ci   g:
otherwise
: (14)
Given that a competitive search equilibrium model matches jobs and
labour constrained e¢ ciently, the equilibrium is simple to derive if we as-
sume that the discount factor approaches unity (see Appendix 2). In par-
ticular, for each type of worker, equilibrium market tightness, ih  vih=sih,
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is that which maximizes steady state output net of recruiting costs. Thus
the workerslabour market income is given by
Gih = max


yih(1  uih) + auih   kvih
	
; i = A;D; (15)
where uih = e
 ihsih and s
i
h = =

 + (1  )(1  e ih)

. Firms earn zero
prots. Thus all income net of the cost of vacancies goes to workers. In
competitive search equilibrium, this income is maximized and the solution
is
k =
yih   a
1  (1  )(1  (ih ))
e 
i
h ; (16)
where ()  1 e ih e ih is the probability a job searcher gets multiple
job o¤ers and where ih is the value of 
i
h that maximizes (15). Hence
Proposition 1 There exists a unique ih for each yih.
Proof. ih is positive if yih   a > k. Likewise the right-hand side of
equation 16 is monotonically decreasing in ih and equal to zero if 
i
h is
large. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium value of ih for each yih.
Below we will look at optimal policy. First we look at general train-
ing programmes, which historically were well established before the more
targeted training programmes were introduced with the adaptation of ac-
tive labour market policy. This happened over the 1990s in many advanced
countries and is widespread today. Inspired thereby, we will after having con-
sidered optimal general training subsidies allow the government to condition
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the training subsidy on individual unemployment duration/risks, which is
what most active programmes do.
3 Optimal policy with a general training subsidy
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the model allowing the
government a general training subsidy in addition to its passive subsidy (the
UI benets). The problem is solved sequentially. We use the competitive
equilibrium allocation of jobs and skills derived above given a set of gov-
ernment transfers. We can then solve for the optimal government transfers
while taking the decentralized (optimal) decision rules for jobs and human
capital as given.
The government executes the transfers a; g and seeks to maximize the
social welfare function
Y = max
a;g
(WAh + (1  )WDh0 ) + (1  )minfWAh ;WDh0 g (17)
such that (i) the government budget is balanced with taxes satisfying
t = (auA + hg) + (1  )(auD + h0g) < SA; SD;
where h and h0 indicate the respective human capital choices of advan-
taged and disadvantaged workers, (ii) a participation constraint (PC) that
all workers prefer participation to benets (i.e., no voluntary unemployed)
WAh ;W
D
h0  a (PC)
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and (iii) the determination of WAh and W
D
h0 is given by the equilibrium
outcome of the decentralized economy, which is described in section 2.2.
The solution to the governments problem yields the following proposi-
tions about optimal labour market policy. Suppose that the government is
only interested in wealth maximization, that is  = 1. In this case, we have
the following result.
Proposition 2 If social welfare is determined solely by aggregate wealth
( = 1), optimal government is laissez faire.
Proof. Competitive search equilibrium ensures that any subsidy to one
group of workers increases their output plus the subsidy an amount less than
the cost of the subsidy.
If market tightness and human capital decisions are constrained e¢ cient
given the search frictions, a wealth maximizing government never gives sub-
sidies that would distort these optimal decisions. Subsidies are only possible
if the government evaluates a unit of income spent by a disadvantaged worker
di¤erently than a unit of income spent by an advantaged worker, that is,
if  < 1. Still, a training subsidy that leads to the adoption of training by
both advantaged and disadvantaged workers is not optimal. This is shown
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume  < 1: A rational government never subsidizes the
training of both advantaged and disadvantaged workers.
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Proof. If all agents adopt training, the cost of the subsidy is completely
born by each group. Therefore, competitive search ensures that the optimal
subsidy is zero for both groups of workers.
The direct implication of proposition 2 and 3 is that an optimal training
subsidy must always exclude some workers, and it needs to be the advan-
taged workers that do not get subsidized training as the governments equity
concern is the only possible motive for considering training. As we assume
that the government cannot condition transfers on a particular workers type,
the government will have to relay on self selection.
Suppose that the government seeks to direct the training subsidy to the
disadvantaged workers. This objective is met if the following two incentive
compatibility constraints (ICC) are obeyed: WD1 WD0 andWA0 WA1 :
That is, the disadvantaged workers take up subsidized training while the
advantaged workers do not. More explicit, the constraints are,
GD1   (cD   g)  GD0 (ICC(1))
GA0  GA1   (cA   g) : (ICC(2))
The second incentive compatibility constraint implies that the maximum
active subsidy to disadvantaged workers is given by
gmax = cA  
 
GA1  GA0

: (18)
The behavior of gmax is closely related to the amount spent on passive
subsidies as stated by the following proposition
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Proposition 4 The maximum incentive compatible training subsidy for dis-
advantaged workers, gmax, increases as the passive subsidy, a, increases.
Proof. Comparative statics on equation (15) give @
 
GA1  GA0

=@a < 0
The second ICC denes the minimum subsidy required to make disad-
vantaged workers train,
gmin = cD  
 
GD1  GD0

(19)
Note that a government will subsidize a training programme only if
gmin  gmax:
This inequality is satised only if the marginal increase in labour pro-
ductivity is greater for disadvantaged workers than advantaged workers.
The preceding results concerning optimal government policy apply to any
arbitrary social welfare function in our model. However, in order to derive
an exact solution for optimal activation policy, it is convenient to assume (i)
the social welfare function is given by equation (7) and (ii) disadvantaged
workers are a relatively small fraction of the population. In this case
Proposition 5 If the government assigns a weight to equity ( < 1) and
disadvantaged workers are a su¢ ciently small part of the population ( is
close to one), then the constraint optimal training subsidy is gmax.
Proof. If  is large, any training subsidy given by the government that
does not lead to training by advantaged workers has virtually no e¤ect on
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the level of taxation. In this case, the training subsidy can be treated purely
as a reduction in training costs for the disadvantaged. This subsidy raises
social welfare by an amount bounded away from zero if  < 1 with the
welfare change of advantaged workers going to zero as  approaching unity.
If disadvantaged workers are a large portion of the population, the op-
timal training subsidy is not necessarily gmax. In this case, the result that
the e¢ ciency losses of training are small is not strictly valid. For example, if
disadvantaged make up the entire population, proposition 3 establishes that
the optimal general training subsidy is zero.
With a heterogenous population there is a case for a policy subsidizing
training but it is haltered by the fact that the government cannot discrimi-
nated between advantaged and disadvantaged. Although it is possible for the
government to sort workers by incentive compatible self-selection schemes,
this is still not providing a strong case for a training subsidy. Passive trans-
fers are still the most e¢ cient way of reducing income inequality in this case
as we will illustrate below.
Here we will also show that the picture changes dramatically if the gov-
ernment can use an extra piece of information like, for instance, the individ-
ual workers unemployment risk. Then all of a sudden, training subsidies be-
come an e¢ cient tool in providing equity. As the disadvantaged workers face
higher unemployment risk and thus are more likely to experience long-term
unemployment, all the information the government needs for implementa-
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tion is the duration of any unemployed workers current unemployment spell
and then condition the training subsidies on the spell length.
There is, however, a complication to the use of unemployment experience
as a screening criteria. Under such a policy it becomes an issue for the
advantaged workers to try mimicking the disadvantaged workers in order to
get subsidized training. When the training subsidy is o¤ered unconditional
this is of course not an issue.
The government needs to make sure that advantaged workers do not pre-
fer subsidized training and long unemployment spells rather than no training
subsidy and short unemployment spells. The government does not need to
be concerned about the incentives of the disadvantaged workers as they sim-
ply cannot get re-employed fast enough to mimic the advantaged workers
and neither would they gain anything from conducting such a behaviour.
4 Targeted policy
By its nature UI benets are targeted to the unemployed. The type of
active programmes that many countries have implemented are also directed
at workers that are unemployed; in particular, at the long-term unemployed
workers. In this section we illustrate the di¤erence between a general subsidy
and a subsidy targeted at the high risk workers in terms of their ability in
order to provide equity e¢ ciently. The advantage of targeted active policy
lies in the way its complements passive policy. This complementarity is
much weaker for a general education subsidy.
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4.1 Unemployment as a screening device: active unemploy-
ment programmes
When we set up the incentive compatibility constraints (ICC) above we did
not worry about workers not signalling their true type to the government.
This we need to do here for the advantaged workers (the disadvantaged work-
ers cannot mimic the advantaged one). Let WAh (u
0) be the average income
to an advantaged worker with training h who has chosen unemployment u0:
Now the government needs to make sure that the advantaged workers do not
want to be burdened with the unemployment rate of trained disadvantaged
workers uD1 just to get the training subsidy, but rather prefer the unemploy-
ment rate of her own type uA0 ; that is, W
A
0 (u
A
0 ) WA1 (uD1 ): More explicitly,
this ICC is yA0 (1  uA0 ) + auA0   kvA0  yA1 (1  uD1 ) + auD1   kvD1   (cA   g);
where vD1 is the equilibrium vacancy in the submarket for trained disadvan-
taged workers. Recall that yA0 (1 uA0 )+auA0  kvA0 = GA0 (uA0 ): Thus, written
in a form compatible with the ICCs of the previous section, we have,
GA0 (u
A
0 )  GA1 (uD1 )  (cA   g): (ICC(2))
This constraint is more slack than the one needed in the previous section,
which was WA0 (u
A
0 )  WA1 (uA1 )): This is so, because WA1 (uA1 ) > WA1 (uD1 );
which follows from uA1 < u
D
1 corresponding to 
A
1 > 
D
1 , as 
i
h increases
in productivity. Hence if advantaged workers should mimic disadvantaged
workers, this corresponds to that they seem to have a lower productivity
and thereby experience a higher unemployment rate as fewer vacancies are
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supplied.
Before we introduce the new ICC, (ICC(2)), into our model we will
make an important simplication in order to facilitate the evaluating of a
government training subsidies, which are targeted at workers who have a
higher risk of unemployment. Suppose that a is constant and that gj is
given by 0 if individual j is not in a training programme and g if j is being
activated, that is, in a training programme. Note that this assumption
will make the active transfers dependent on the equilibrium unemployment
rate (of course a is linearly dependent since it is only paid in the event of
unemployment). We approximate the non-linear relationship between (i)
the unemployment rate of a particular type of workers and (ii) the average
amount of active training subsidies paid out to such workers by the following
simple step-wise function
g(u) =
8<: g0 ifif ui  u

otherwise
(20)
This is only a crude representation of training subsidy that is conditioned on
a su¢ cient unemployment duration. However, it should capture, to a close
approximation, the essential non-linearity between benet provision and the
equilibrium unemployment rate of each group when benets are determined
by unemployment duration.
The per period income of a worker investing in human capital can be
written as follows
W ih = S
i
h   t = Gih   h(ci   g)  t; i 2 fA;Dg; h 2 f0; 1g (21)
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where Gih is the workers labour market income as a function of their training
decision, g is the governments subsidy to training, h(ci   g) is the cost of
training that is born by the worker, and t is a lump sum tax determined by
the government.
4.2 Equilibrium with optimal targeted policy
The model is unchanged except that the active transfer is paid only if the
workers type observes a su¢ ciently high unemployment rate. The equilib-
rium supply of jobs and human capital is approximated by the following
static welfare optimization problem. The steady state welfare per worker
per period of type i 2 fA;Dg is given by
Gi(u
) = max
h 2 f0; 1g
ih  0
8<: yih(1  uih) + auih   (ci   g)h  kvihyih(1  uih) + auih   cih  kvih
if uih  u
otherwise
(22)
where ih = v
i
h=s
i
h; u
i
h = e
 ihsih and s
i
h = =

 + (1  )(1  e ih)

. Max-
imizing Gi(u) gives
yih   a
1  (1  )(1  (ih ))
e 
i
h = k; (23)
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which is the same as equation (15). The equilibrium training decision is
given by
h =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
0
1
0
if ui1  u and Gi(ujh = 1) Gi(h = 0)  ci   g ,
if ui1  u and Gi(ujh = 1) Gi(h = 0) < ci   g ,
if ui1 < u
 and Gi(h = 1) Gi(h = 0)  ci;
if ui1 < u
 and Gi(h = 1) Gi(h = 0) < ci:
(24)
Suppose that the government can execute transfers a; g. The government
seeks to maximize the social welfare function
Y 0 = max
a;g;u
(WA + (1  )WD) + (1  )minfWA;WDg
such that
t  (auA + hg) + (1  )(auD + h0g)  SA; SD
is the governments budget constraint. The constraints on this maximization
problem are the fact that a; g determine uA; uD; h; h0 by the equilibrium
supply of jobs and human capital in the previous subsection.
Welfare is always higher than in the basic model without targeted train-
ing, because activation gives the government an extra instrument to solve
the incentive compatibility problem. In particular, the following policy menu
is better.
1. For each value of the passive subsidy, a; compute the equilibrium un-
employment rate, u; of trained disadvantaged workers.
2. Calculate the payo¤s of (i) untrained advantaged workers and (ii) un-
subsidized trained advantaged workers when the unemployment rate
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of advantaged workers is u:
3. Set the subsidy of disadvantaged workers equal to the di¤erence of (i)
and (ii) in 2.
The reason this scheme outperforms the scheme in the previous section is
that the payo¤ of the unsubsidized constrained trained advantaged workers
in 2 is lower than the payo¤of unconstrained trained advantaged workers. In
particular, for a given passive subsidy, the incentive compatibility constraint
of active subsidies is weakened if they are targeted to the long term unem-
ployed. The fact that advantaged workers must mimic the unemployment
rate of disadvantaged workers (experience a large duration in unemploy-
ment), implies that a larger active subsidy can be paid to disadvantaged
workers. Therefore, an incentive compatible training subsidy can be paid
to disadvantaged workers even if the training yields signicant productivity
benets for advantaged workers, who will otherwise go untrained if training
is not subsidized.
The e¤ect of these targeted policies on the relationship between active
and passive subsidies is also changed. In the diagram we observe that at
low values of the passive subsidy there is only a small gap (the line from
point a to b) between the unemployment rates of trained advantaged and
disadvantaged workers. In this case, there is only a small additional cost to
advantaged workers of accepting the unemployment rate of disadvantaged
workers (which is suboptimal from the point of view of advantaged workers)
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Figure 3: Unemployment and the passive subsidy
in order to gain the training subsidy. In the diagram, we see that the gap be-
tween the two unemployment rates widens as the passive subsidy increases.
Therefore, the cost of accepting the unemployment rate of disadvantaged
workers is larger. Thus even larger active subsidies can be delivered to dis-
advantaged workers without violating the incentive compatibility constraint
that advantaged workers do not accept the training subsidy.
In the next section we illustrate the di¤erence between combining a tra-
ditional general UI benet scheme with a targeted training subsidy and a
general training subsidy by performing some quantitative analysis. The re-
sults just presented concludes that targeted training reduces the trade-o¤
between obtaining e¢ ciency and reducing inequality by raising opportuni-
ties for disadvantaged workers. This result is conrmed by simulations in
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the next section.
5 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents data on the pattern on spending in OECD countries.
We then do two simulations of our model. First, we simulate the model
with training subsidies that are not conditioned on unemployment. Then
the model is simulated with training subsidies that are conditioned on un-
employment.
We observe that there is a positive correlation between how much money
is spent on passive programmes and how much money is spent on active pro-
grammes. Furthermore, high spending countries seem to operate on a more
favorable equity-e¢ ciency trade o¤ than the other countries. We see this by
comparing Figure 2, which pictures the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ for some
selected OECD countries, to Figure 1. (See Figure 1 and 2 in the Introduc-
tion). This subsection evaluates the implications of the model numerically.
We simulate the model in order to determine whether the model can repli-
cate the observed variations in economic e¢ ciency, equity and spending on
active and passive policies. The baseline model assumes parameters that
give labour market ows and income measures for low income groups in the
economy which usually are characterised by very high unemployment rates.
Considering as a baseline the case where the economy is completely laissez
faire, we then see how this economy behaves as a greater concern for equity
is introduced.
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5.1 Numerical Simulation I
The following is a simulation of the model without time varying subsidies
to training.
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Table 1: Simulations for the non-targeted case.
 = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75
a = 0 a = 0:337 a = 0:224 a = 0:112
g = 0 g = 0:0802 g = 0:0775 g = 0:0751
uD1 0:2080 0:1850 0:1667 0:1523
uA0 0:1255 0:1585 0:1454 0:1346
u 0:1296 0:1598 0:1465 0:1355
SD 0:3424 0:4912 0:4898 0:4874
SA 0:8658 0:8553 0:8593 0:8614
E¢ ciency loss, pct.   15:74 16:19 16:41
Equality gain, pct.   30:44 29:40 28:54
Gain D, pct.   43:47 43:06 42:36
Loss A, pct.   1:21 0:75 0:51
The parameters of the model are:
Parameter y1D y
0
D y
1
A y
0
A  cD cA  k
Value 1.27 0.82 1.70 1.44 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.95 0.9
If the subsidy to training is general (i.e. not conditioned on unemploy-
ment), then subsidies to active and passive labour market programmes are
not closely related, spending on the active subsidies is small, and there exists
a large trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency.
5.2 Numerical Simulation II
The following is a simulation of the model in which unemployment rates act
as a screening device for the delivery of active benets. Hence, only workers
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facing high unemployment rates receive active benets. That is, we consider
simulations for the targeted case. Table 2 shows the results.
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Table 2: Simulations for the targeted case.
 = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75
a = 0 a = 0:595 a = 0:330 a = 0:155
g = 0 g = 0:1125 g = 0:0927 g = 0:0853
uD1 0:2080 0:2516 0:184 0:1574
uA0 0:1255 0:2017 0:1576 0:1385
u 0:1296 0:2042 0:1589 0:1395
SD 0:3424 0:5095 0:503 0:4973
SA 0:8658 0:8320 0:8550 0:8603
E¢ ciency loss, pct.   13:21 15:77 16:35
Equality gain, pct.   38:39 32:80 30:64
Gain D, pct.   48:81 46:98 45:25
Loss A, pct.   3:91 1:25 0:63
The parameters of the model are the same as the previous subsection.
If the training subsidy is targeted, then subsidies to active and passive
labour market programmes are more strongly positively related, spending
on active subsidies is larger, and there exists a smaller trade-o¤ between
equity and e¢ ciency.
Figure 4 shows a graphic representation of the di¤erence in-between the
targeted and the non-targeted case. The upper graph represents welfare
maximising values of the passive subsidy a and the active subsidy g as 
varies when the training subsidy is targeted on the group of workers ex-
periencing the highest rate of unemployment. The lower graph represents
welfare maximising values of the passive subsidy a and the active subsidy
g as  varies when the training subsidy is general. The parameter ; rep-
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resenting the weight put on the Benthamite sum of utilities social welfare
function, decreases as we move from left to right in the gure. Hence, as
conrmed in the two tables, a lower , that is a relatively higher weight on
equality leads to higher welfare maximising values of a and g. We observe
that higher values of both active and passive subsidies are reached for given
 in the targeted case. Furthermore, the lower  is, the larger is the increase
in the welfare maximising value of g in the targeted case, but not in the case
of a general subsidy.
These exercises have illustrated that active and passive subsidies can
be strategic complements. The strength of this complementarity is greatly
increased if the active subsidy is targeted. This occurs because higher passive
benets tends to raise the unemployment rate of disadvantaged workers
which in turn weakens the incentive compatibility constraint on the active
subsidy. And, in contrast to a general subsidy, a targeted active subsidy can
be delivered optimally to disadvantaged workers even if the marginal gain
in productivity (from training) is higher for advantaged workers. Finally,
disadvantaged workers must experience a larger gain in productivity if their
training is to be subsidized using a non targeted active subsidy.
6 Conclusions
The massive and persistent emphasis put on activation and training of unem-
ployed individuals in developed countries in general and in big-welfare-state
countries in particular is a puzzle, because it has been di¢ cult to identify
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Figure 4: Welfare maximising values of a and g as the weight on equity
increases, that is  decreases from 0:95 to 0:25 going from left to right.
positive e¤ects - individual as well as macro-level e¤ects - from the often
huge spending on these programmes. This is surveyed by Martin (2000)
Heckman, Lalonde, Smith
1999) and OECD (2003). So either politics are irrational or the profession
has not been looking for e¤ects in the right places. For instance, even if there
are no e¤ects at the mean for any of the programmes, there could be an e¤ect
at the macro level - e.g., less inequality - if it is the more disadvantaged
workers who gain productivity from the programmes. This is conceivable
as Martin (2000), Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) and OECD (2004)
also conclude that some programmes have very signicant e¤ects for some
groups of individuals. I OECD (2003) it is also suggested that activation
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policies have reduced poverty rates in some European countries.
Suppose income equality is a main objective for some countries along
side with high average income. Could it then be that active programmes
are favored by some countries because such programmes reduce inequality
e¢ ciently when used together with traditional passive programmes like UI
benets? This is the question that we have been discussing in this paper and
the answer is in the a¢ rmative. If income equality is a su¢ ciently strong
objective to a government then it might well be rational to implement active
training programmes for the long term unemployed together with passive
benet programmes like UI. This combination is far more e¤ective that
the combination of UI benets and a general education subsidy. At the
principal level, this could vindicate high spending on activation by countries
with strong taste for equity. Our results also suggests that high passive and
active spending goes hand in hand. Both these phenomenon can be observed
in the data for the OECD countries.
These results are developed in a model with heterogenous workers, hu-
man capital investment, and unemployment. The model is "pure" in the
sense that laissez faireis e¢ cient: the privately chosen level of training is
e¢ cient and even though disadvantaged workers of low skills are the more
unemployed ones, unemployment is e¢ cient and reects search and match-
ing frictions. There are no externalities to justify training subsidies. We
have also deliberately disregarded the traditional insurance aspect of pas-
sive policies by letting agents be risk neutral in our model. So it is not the
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usual missing insurance market that implies government spending on UI in
optimum. The redistributive functioning of UI in this model with heteroge-
nous unemployment risk is enough to have passive transfers to unemployed
entering the optimal policy packaged (of a government that maximizes a so-
cial welfare function that puts weight on both equity and income e¢ ciency).
Furthermore, not only can we explain the joint use of passive and ac-
tive subsidies, the model also shed light on the big variation in the labour
market policies of OECD countries. Our results suggest that much of the
variation in policy can be explained by di¤erent social objectives rather than
by ine¢ cient policy or di¤erences in technology and human capital.
The analysis of this paper can be improved in two directions. First, the
empirical assessment of the theory is only suggestive. An involved empirical
study is needed to isolate the specic causes of policy variation across OECD
countries. Second, the theory of the model could also be extended to
incorporate a more detailed description of active labour market programmes.
For example, di¤erent elements of active programmes, including di¤erent
subsidies for training employed and unemployed workers, could be studied.
We leave these improvements for further research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Spending on Active and Passive Policy
Active and passive Labour market policy as percentages of GDP for selected
OECD countries for a time period is illustrated in Figure 5. An apparent
complementary pattern, found in Figure 1, is also found following a partic-
ular country over time. The lines in Figure 5 are simple OLS predictions
country by country.
For Denmark and the Netherlands, active and passive policy seems to
be substitutes, nevertheless. The following gures show that in these cases
major reforms are visible as structural shifts. In Denmark in 1994, there was
a general shift towards mandatory activation and in general more emphasis
was put on active labour market policy relatively to passive policy. This
could explain the shift to the right that we see in Figure 6. In the Nether-
lands there was a major restructuring of the benet system in 1987. The
replacement ratios were lowered from 80 to 70% and eligibility rules were
tightened. Again in 1996 the benet sanction system was further toughened
and in 1998 the Netherlands Job-seekers Employment ACT was introduced.
During the more stable years in between we do observe a complementary
pattern between active and passive policy (see Figure 7) although it is week.
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OECD countries, 1986-2000
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8 Solution Equivalence
This appendix shows that the decentralized economy is equivalent to the
solution of a simple static maximization problem if the discount factor ap-
proaches unity. (1) The decentralized asset equations are given by
 =
y + (V +)
1  (1  )
 = 0
V = V (u) + (1  e    e )(  V (u))
 =  k + e (  V (u));
V (u) = a+ V
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These equations for ; V; V (u); and  can rewritten to get a single expres-
sion for .
k = ye  + k(1  )(e  + e )
and that in the limit as  approaches 1 we get
k = ye  + k(1  )(e  + e ) (A1)
(2) Now consider the simple static problem of maximizing steady state out-
put less recruiting costs. In this case
W = max

y(1  u) + au  kv
such that
 = v=s
s =

 + (1  )(1  e )
u = s(1  e )
The solution to this problem is the same as A1.
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